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Abstract 
During the mid to late 1900s many Latin American countries found themselves under the rule of 
violent military regimes and in civil war. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the atrocities 
committed in the late 20th century throughout Latin America and to discuss the ways in which 
these societies, affected by state violence, were able to overcome the past. In this paper, I will 
look at the purpose of truth and reconciliation commissions and their outcomes in Chile, 
Argentina, and Guatemala in order to find some similarities and compare and contrast the 
successes and failures of the different commissions in their respective settings.  
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Introduction 
The idea of human rights… is a social construct which reflects social acknowledgements of 
individual and communal basic and perceived needs in a particular historical period. In short, 
human rights are statements of needs. Of all species of the animal kingdom humans appear the 
most vulnerable. The susceptibility of humans to succumb to illness and misfortunes is a prime 
reason that the social construct of “human rights” is necessary. 1 
 
 Humans are susceptible to nature, but the greatest threat to the well-being of a 
human is another one.  Human history is plagued with murder, war and violent 
repressions by individuals in positions of power. These individuals out of spite, out of a 
sense of superiority, out of a sense of duty, feel that they are entitled to do what they do 
because of the power that they wield. Many will argue that the reasons for which 
atrocities happen are complex and nuanced but regardless of the reasons, the violations of 
human rights are a crime against humanity. We as members of democratically elected 
represented societies expect that those to whom we yield power will act in accordance 
with our individual interests and preferences, after all they are supposed to represent 
society. But when those democratically elected members of society engage in activities 
that repress and discriminate against individuals’ personal human rights, how is it that we 
go about holding those individuals accountable? And when the wielders of power go 
even further as to murder innocent civilians in an organized systematic means using the 
resources of the state, a state that has been entrusted with the monopoly of violence, a 
state that is comprised of the very same victims, what is it that those victims can do? 
When the regime comes to an end, what is the role of society and how should it engage 
																																																						
1 Wronka, Joseph. n.d. Human Rights and Social Policy in the 21st Century. Lanham,  
Maryland: University Press of America, Inc. 
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with those responsible for crimes against humanity? What should the leaders of the 
society that gain power following the morally corrupt regime focus on, should they focus 
on ensuring that the society achieve peace and stability even at the expense of justice for 
the victims of the regime? Numerous countries throughout Latin America have directly 
dealt with this question of overcoming dictatorial regimes.  
James Monroe in 1823 issued the Monroe Doctrine that established that the 
European countries, primarily, should stay out of the American continents. This doctrine 
would outline the attitude of the United States towards its neighbors in the American 
continents by further implying that European countries who meddled with independent 
countries in the Americas would be viewed as unfriendly by the United States. In the mid 
to late 1900s in the midst of the cold war the United States launched a campaign of 
destabilizing democratically elected regimes throughout Latin America attempting to 
secure its own interests in its backyard. Additionally, the United States following the end 
of WWII, engaged in activities around the world aimed at preventing the spread of 
communism and so it established the Army School of the Americas. Through this 
institution the United States provided training and anti-communist indoctrination to Latin 
American military personnel, some of whom would go on to participate, even lead, coups 
that resulted in civil-military control of Latin American countries. However, the United 
States would also engage more directly in the politics of Latin America by funding coups 
and providing strategic support for covert activities. The military dictatorships that came 
to power would go on to murder, forcefully disappear and brutally torture in 
unimaginable ways those that the regime viewed as a threat. But in the aftermath of the 
brutality, when the country had lived through years of violence and psychological fear 
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and instability, how was the country to move forward? These countries in transition were 
at a crossroads, they had to decide how to offer compensation and justice for the victims 
and the family members of the victims without causing more instability. The transitional 
governments had to deal with the fact that those who were responsible for unthinkable 
violations to human rights would never agree to be prosecuted for their actions and would 
do their best to avoid being held accountable. But before the transitional governments 
could know what they should do they had to find the truth, the truth that had been hidden 
for the years of the dictatorships because the truth in the periods of dictatorships was the 
truth that the dictatorship wanted the people to know. So how could a transitional 
government justify actions, even know what to do if they didn’t know the full truth. In 
recent years, countries following periods of atrocities have as common practice 
established truth and reconciliation commissions in order to investigate the crimes and to 
try to identify those who have been hurt.  
However, the specific purposes of the truth and reconciliation commissions vary  
and they vary because of the differing opinion as to how far the truth commissions should 
go in establishing blame if there should be any established at all by the government 
commissioned investigation. Should countries’ commissions be focused on redistributive 
justice or retributive justice?  
 
Methodology and Purpose 
This paper has a primary goal to evaluate and compare three different cases of 
truth and reconciliation committees and highlight the strengths of each of the 
commissions. This study in particular will analyze the cases of Chile, Argentina, and 
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Guatemala and the reports published by the truth commissions in those countries. The 
three cases will be compared on three different areas. Firstly, what degree of blame is 
expressed in the different commission reports. Additionally, did the degree of blame 
outlined in the report influence in the retributive justice against the perpetrators of mass 
atrocities? Were the victims and the victims’ families given an avenue or the support in 
order to bring the perpetuators to justice? Secondly, what recommendations were made in 
the report in regard to the compensation of the victims and the victims’ families? 
Furthermore, on the same question, what sort of policies have been carried out and how 
have they been received by the specific countries? Finally, what policies were 
recommended by these truth commissions in order to prevent the violation of human 
rights in the future? To answer these questions, the paper will engage in evaluating the 
commission reports and the literature published regarding the reports by both American 
and Latin American scholars some of which teach at institutions in the countries that 
suffered under a repressive regime. Ultimately it will be clear that truth and reconciliation 
committees should ensure that they provide a variety of recommendations that both 
acknowledge the guilt of the individuals who have carried out atrocities and also have 
strong forms of reparations or compensating those who have been afflicted by a 
dictatorships injustice. But most importantly it will be evident that justice is necessary in 
order to give stronger significance to the truth that is uncovered, but that justice will very 
much depend on the government that is in power and its ability and commitment to bring 
about change.  
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Chapter 1: Justice  
The nature of truth seeking commissions is that they are usually created by the 
governments of individual countries to carry out investigations and establish the truth as 
best as they can about a specific period of time. In addition, it is important to recognize 
that the different countries will have different goals that will probably be influenced by 
the regimes that task the commission and the power of the regime. As will be explained 
in the particular cases, the three countries being examined had different goals and we can 
see that the level of political involvement of perpetrators influenced in the ultimate goals 
and the execution of the search for the truth. The search for truth, however, is a 
particularly hard one when the perpetrators access most of the knowledge, hold most of 
the information regarding the period that commissions are tasked with investigating. This 
creates a very strong dilemma that is still debated today, should individuals guilty of 
crimes against humanity be given amnesty if they provide information that is given to 
ultimately bring the fuller truth the world? 
For some guidance on answering this question one can look to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa following the end of Apartheid.  During said 
commission, amnesty was granted to individuals who told the entire truth and those who 
provided a political justification for their involvements in particular crimes. However, to 
some the search of truth is not enough to justify the granting of amnesty to criminals. “’It 
stinks to high heaven…to imagine that after confessing these people who committed the 
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more horrendous crimes will be patted on the shoulder by the TRC.’”2 In addition Kevin 
Avruch further adds to this when he cites evidence that there is a strong feeling for 
retributive justice in South Africa and that victims feel robbed of legal recourses to 
achieve justice3. But Alex Boraine would argue that the approach of a limited amnesty 
was actually crucial for a peaceful transition of South Africa into a stable state. As he 
points out the right-wing party, the state military and security forces warned Mandela that 
if the government attempted to prosecute individuals responsible for the apartheid they 
would make peaceful elections impossible4. This power held by the perpetuators of 
apartheid is due to the way in which the new government came to be. As Boraine 
explains in South Africa the conflict of apartheid was not resolved through a war with a 
winning side but instead was resolved through negotiation which meant that there would 
have to be some compromises made by both sides5. Furthermore, Elizabeth Kiss would 
argue that there was a moral justification in offering amnesty in order to achieve the goals 
of the Truth and Reconciliation commission. It was moral to allow criminals to go free in 
exchange for peace and stability.  
Kiss defends this point of view under the idea of restorative justice, a justice that 
focuses on making sure the victims of the egregious acts are at the center of all efforts 
																																																						
2Rotberg, Robert I. "Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation." In Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, by Robert I. 
Rotberg, Dennis Thompson, & Robert I. I. Rotberg, 3-22. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000. 
3 Avruch, Kevin. 2010. "Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Problems in  
Transitional Justice and the Reconstruction of Identity." Transcultural Psychiatry 33-49. 
 
4 Boraine, Alex. "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way." In Truth V. 
Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, by Robert I. Rotberg, Dennis Thompson, & 
Robert I. I. Rotberg, 143. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000 
5 Ibid. 147. 
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regarding truth and reconciliation committees. Kiss, further than the argument that the 
use of amnesty provides for a more peaceful transition, defends the need for the truth as 
crucial to moving on as a society. As was the case in many countries that commissioned 
truth commissions, the transition to democratic governments came as a result of 
negotiations and thus it was vitally important for countries truth commissions to be 
viewed as impartial. Additionally, they had the task of ensuring that their reports avoided 
presenting a report with “’partisan’ or ‘selective’ accounts of past conflicts” because 
doing so would “easily provide the basis for mobilization towards further conflicts’”.6 
But more specifically to individuals, Kiss points out that individuals greatly benefit from 
the commissions just by being able to tell their story. As she put it, there is a healing 
power for survivors being able to tell their story to official commissions, commissions 
working for the governments that once used to repress them, the government that once 
stripped them of their voice.7 Accepting the role of the truth in being able to transform 
societies, how is it that we as societies can balance the countries’, and victims’, right to 
the truth and the right to retributive justice. A model that has been suggested by many is 
the idea of transitional justice.  
Transitional justice according to the International Center for Transitional Justice 
is “is the attempt to confront impunity, seek effective redress and prevent recurrence not 
in the routine application of normative standards, but in the careful and conscious 
																																																						
6 Kiss, Elizabeth. "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections 
on Restorative Justice." In Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, by 
Robert I. Rotberg, Dennis Thompson, & Robert I. I. Rotberg, 72. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000. 
7 Ibid.   
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appreciation of the contexts where it is to be done”8. Transitional justice is about 
comprehensive action that includes criminal prosecution for the most serious offenders, 
finding the truth, reparations, and reforms to laws and law enforcement agencies. 
Transitional justice relies on a different understanding than retributive justice. 
Transitional justice is heavily influence by the idea from restorative justice that the state 
should focus more on addressing the victims rather than prosecution of individuals. It is 
premised on the idea of forgiveness rather than vengeance which some have argued 
actually produces better results for the victims9.  It is important to remember at this point 
that truth and reconciliation committees operate under the assumption that the truth will 
help society reconcile, it will help the society to come together after a tumultuous period 
of repression.  
One of the harms to reconciliation caused by transitional justice models is the fact 
that the trials that do take place create divide between perpetrators and victims10. An 
interesting case of this is in Chile where 55% of the population believe that the 
dictatorship was bad, 9% said that the dictatorship of Pinochet was good and the rest had 
no opinion or had mix thoughts regarding the dictatorship11. Trials following the end of 
the dictatorship created divide as those on the right tend view Pinochet favorably because 
																																																						
8 "What is Transitional Justice? | ICTJ." International Center for Transitional Justice. July 
11, 2017. Accessed November 17, 2017. https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice. 
9 Avruch, Kevin. “Truth and Reconciliation Commissions” 
10 Schabas, William A., Hughes, Edel, and Thakur, Ramesh Chandra, eds. 2007. 
Atrocities and International Accountability: Beyond Transnational Justice. 36.Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press. Accessed November 22, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
11 Long, Gideon. "Chile still split over Gen Augusto Pinochet legacy." BBC News. 
September 09, 2013. Accessed November 17, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
latin-america-24014501. 
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they regard him as a hero who defended the country against the dangers of socialism. As 
Mani further points out, truth and reconciliation commissions “fail to move from the 
divided past of perpetrators versus victims to a united future of all survivors of conflict, 
whatever their past role”12.  However, this begs the question, should we consider 
everyone as a survivor and is this really the best form of justice in order to achieve a 
better society in which we prevent this from happening? 
Through the cases of the Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala we will consider some 
of these models and ideas of justice. We will look at the commission reports issued and 
see that lots of the ideas discussed apply to the different cases. The question about which 
form of justice is the best form of justice is best defined on a case by case basis. There is 
no universal model for truth commissions and every commission is tasked with different 
goals and objectives in its investigations. Through an analysis of the three different cases 
we will highlight the strengths and the weaknesses of the different reports to try to define 
ideal commission goals based on the evidence that is available on the particular cases.   
 
Chapter 2: Chile 
Allende and the Rise of Pinochet 
In 1970 Salvador Allende became the first democratically elected Socialist 
president in all of Latin America. Allende, a long-time politician, had ran for the 
presidency on multiple occasions but was finally able to win in 1970. Allende’s socialist 
tendencies were quite clear throughout his campaign and when elected into office began 
																																																						
12 Schabas, William et al. Atrocities and International Accountability.  
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to carry out the socialist reforms on which he had campaigned. One of the largest reforms 
of his campaign was the nationalization of Chilean Copper. Copper was a resource that 
was, and is, plentiful in Chile and before Allende took the presidency it was mostly 
privately owned. According to Felipe Larrain and Patricio Meller, when Salvador 
Allende came to power he continued, rather than started, the nationalization of copper 
that had been started by the previous administration of Ricardo Frei. Allende and his 
predecessor sought to nationalize the foreign owned copper mined through constitutional 
reforms that were approved by the congress because at the time the policies were 
extremely popular. People liked the idea that they would have a larger stake in the 
resources that were plentiful in the country. At first the government engaged in buying 
majority of the shares in the larger copper foreign owned companies. Ultimately, the 
form of compensation to the foreign based owners of the mines would be a huge point of 
contention with the state. Under the constitutional amendment, the state would pay the 
companies their market value but was allowed to subtract from the market value the 
“excess profits obtained by the foreigners since 1965… some $800 million from the total 
indemnification”13. But Allende would not stop at controlling copper mining but would 
expand to nationalize even more of the countries resources, including those not owned by 
foreign actors.  
 The fact that Allende wanted to take control over non-cooper assets owned by 
domestic owners presented a problem because the constitutional amendment didn’t help 
																																																						
13 Larrain, Felipe, and Patricio Meller. "The Socialist Populist Chilean Experience 1970-
1973." In The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin america, by Rudiger Dornbusch, & 
Sebastian Edwards, 175-221. University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
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much in domestic matters. However, Allende and Unidad Politica, his political party, 
swiftly moved throughout the country nationalizing both large and small companies and 
even nationalizing 90% of the banking sector by the end of the first year14. Through the 
use of laws that had been passed in previous administrations but had not been used yet. 
Allende’s government targeted companies and industries at its own discretion never 
really defining which targets it would go after. The rapid nationalization that went on 
throughout the country created resentment within right wing political parties and the 
wealthier members of society because the notion of private property seemed to be quickly 
evaporating. The right wing political groups and the Partido Democrata Cristiano, which 
formed part of the UP that helped Allende get elected but left the political coalition in 
opposition of aggressive nationalization efforts, sought the assistance of the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out a coup de tat.  
 In 1970 there was an organized effort to try to prevent the election of Salvador 
Allende in which sympathizers of a former military officer Roberto Viaux, sought to 
kidnap Rene Schneider, the current army commander in chief. Though declassified CIA 
documents show that the agency did not actively support the organization, despite 
communication, they did provide a Viaux plotter who escaped prosecution with $35,000 
USD in “an effort to keep the prior contact secret”15. With regards to the 1973 coup the 
United States CIA maintains that it did not provide direct support for the coup but does 
acknowledge that it did provide funding to sway the elections in the country and to hurt 
																																																						
14I Larrain, Felipe, and Patricio Meller. "The Socialist Populist Chilean Experience” 
15 The National Security Archive. Accessed November 27, 2017.  
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//news/20000919/01-13.htm. 
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the public image of Allende and the socialist experiment. Following the coup, the United 
States continued to provide funding for propaganda efforts by the conservative news 
organization, El Mercurio, which is believed to have received at least $2 million16. In the 
months leading up to the coup the right wing political groups spent money on anti-
Allende propaganda, some of which came from the money allocated by the United States 
funds appropriated for delegitimizing the Allende regime before the 1976 election. 
Numerous strikes throughout the country along with shortages of goods lead the Allende 
government to push for rationing of state resources. The economic crisis was caused for a 
variety of reasons including United States economic pressure on Chile. “recently 
declassified NSC records on Chile show conclusively that the Nixon administration 
moved quickly, quietly and politically to shut down multilateral and bilateral aid to 
Chile”17. Additionally, the United states worked hard to ensure that the World Bank 
disqualified Chile “for a pending $21 million livestock-improvement credit.”18 Coupled 
with a downgrading of its credit score at the behest of president Nixon the United States 
was successful in its mission to economically undermine the Allende administration. 
Which would prove vital to the legitimacy of the coup. The economic pressure and chaos 
in Chile prior to the coup of September 11, 1973 proved to be vital to the tolerance and 
																																																						
16 Bonnefoy, Pascale. "Documenting U.S. Role in Democracy’s Fall and Dictator’s Rise 
in Chile." The New York Times. October 14, 2017. Accessed November 27, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/14/world/americas/chile-coup-cia-
museum.html?_r=0. 
17 Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File : A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and 
Accountability. New York: The New Press, 2013. Accessed November 23, 2017. 
ProQuest Ebook Central. 
18 Ibid.  
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legitimacy of the civil military dictatorship that would seize power in brutal 
bombardment of the national palace.  
 
Chile under Pinochet 
Following the seizure of power by the Pinochet thousands of political dissidents 
went missing. The Chilean government would detain and forceful disappear thousands of 
individuals it perceived a threat to the regime and as opponents. The state would use the 
national police for, Los Carabineros and the DINA, the states’ secret police organization,  
to carry out its detentions. Individuals detained would be imprisoned in makeshift 
concentration camps throughout the country and would be tortured and/or murdered. The 
government in many cases would deny having individuals in captivity either arguing that 
they had never detained an individual or that the individual had been set free. 
Additionally, when an influential leader or member of the community was forcefully 
disappeared El Mercurio would publish news articles in which the detained was charged 
with conspiracy against the government in an attempt to legitimize the detainment to the 
general public. Some members of society not directly affected were suspicious but life 
seemed to be better under the military dictatorship.  
It is important to point out that following the seizure of power by the Pinochet 
regime the shortages had seemed to disappear. This is because the right wing political 
groups had funded shortages and strikes throughout the country in order to create the 
economic chaos to prime for the success of the coup. Following the coup, the strikes and 
shortages seemed to go away and the government engaged in denationalization in an 
effort to undue all of Allendes policies which was very popular by business owners. The 
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seeming improvement in the economy seemed to legitimize the military council that had 
taken control of the country and had instituted wide sweeping reforms to the country’s 
policies that had as a focus the privatization of the economy, culminating in an overhaul 
of the constitution after it ratified in a plebiscite in September 1980. For 17 years the 
military dictatorship would rule in Chile until the 1990 when it agreed to hold a 
referendum asking the country whether it wanted the equivalent of another presidential 
term under the military dictatorship or if it wanted to hold elections. The country 
narrowly voted to call for the end of the dictatorship and for elections to be held. 
However, the elections were held under the condition that the new government would 
agree to uphold some of the demands of the government, demands that will later be 
discussed in this chapter. Under the military council set up by Pinochet Chilean dissidents 
and opponents would live some of the darkest years of their lives.   
 
Transition 
In 1990, following a plebiscite in which the people declared that they wanted free 
and fair elections, the first truth commission would be established by Patricio Aylwin. 
Throughout his campaign Aylwin expressed his support for the establishment of a truth 
commission that would bring to light all the truths that had been covered up during the 17 
years under a military dictatorship. Additionally, as Priscilla Hayer tells us, though the 
commissions can serve as a means of establishing the truth, truth and reconciliation 
commissions also serve the purpose of the state acknowledging its past19. Acknowledging 
																																																						
19 Hayner, Priscilla B. "Fifteen Truth Commissions--1974 to 1994: A Comparative 
Study." Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 607. doi:10.2307/762562. 
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the past actions of the state is even more relevant especially in the case of Chile where for 
17 years the state covered up and denied its involvement in the forced disappearance of 
thousands of individuals. It is with this in mind that in May of 1990, Aylwin established 
la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (the National Commission for Truth 
and Reconciliation) that would more commonly be referred to as the Rettig report, after 
Raul Rettig the chair of the commission. The established purpose of the National 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was “to investigate abuses resulting in death or 
disappearance over the previous seventeen years of military rule.”20 However, the 
mandate specified that the commission could only investigate human rights abuses that 
resulted in death or disappearance thereby excluding the investigation of cases of torture 
that did not result in death. The rationale that Aylwin gave for not including torture as 
part of the report was the fact that the only denied the allegations of murder and forced 
disappearance but not cases of exile or illegal imprisonment.21  
Within this larger mandate the commission tasks were outlined in the commission 
report. The commission was to establish the events that transpired, to try to identify 
victims by name and what happened to them, to “recommend such measures of reparation 
and reinstatement as it regards just” and “to recommend the legal and administrative 
measures which in its judgement should be adopted in order to prevent actions such as 
those mentioned in this article from being committed”22. However, the commission report 
also points out that the commission did not have prosecutorial power, meaning that the 
																																																						
20 Hayner, Priscilla B. "Fifteen Truth Commissions” 
21	Weissbrodt, David, and Paul W. Fraser. "Report of the Chilean National Commission 
on Truth and Reconciliation." Human Rights Quarterly 14, no. 4 (1992): 601-622. 
22 Rettig, Raúl. 1991. "National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation ." 
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commission did not have the right or the power to subpoena individuals or compel 
testimony from those it suspected would have a lot to add to the report. The nature of this 
organization was a governmental organization that would try to collect as much 
information as possible. Thus, government organizations were expected to fully comply 
and collaborate with the committee and hand over information that they had that they 
could provide. But the success of this commission was sometimes limited due to the fact 
that the military commanders that formed part of the military council with Augusto 
Pinochet remained in their post after the induction of the new president. Because of 
legislation that Pinochet passed these individuals were given an extended period of time 
as commanders of their posts and even received immunity as part of a condition for free 
and fair elections. It is important to point out that because of policies implemented during 
the civil military dictatorship Pinochet had a seat in the senate for life. Such involvement 
by the perpetuators within the government made some of the investigations difficult to 
complete.  
 The commission at the end of its investigation evaluated a total of 2,920 cases of 
victims of human rights violation and political violence though it was not able to come to 
a conviction on 641 of those cases23. The Rettig report furthermore found that there were 
957 cases in which victims disappeared after arrest, while about 1,068 victims were killed 
by government agents or persons at their service24. The very same table points out that an 
estimated 4.3% of the victims were victims of politically motivated private citizens. The 
following table from the report highlights the reasons for some of the disappearances.  
																																																						
23 Rettig, Raúl. 1991. "National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation ." 
24 Ibid.   
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Figure 1. 25 
The Pinochet regime targeted political dissidents the most. As we can observe 
about half of the victims had some sort of political affiliation. And we notice that those 
who suffered the most were the left wing political parties. Let us remember that the 
Christian Democrat party actually helped in orchestrating the coup against Salvador 
Allende but the total number of victims that were identified to have ties with the 
Christian Democrat party were about 7%. Meanwhile the total number of victims that 
identified with say the socialist party was at about 405 at the time of the report. This is in 
line with what was discussed before that the purpose of the dictatorship was to undue the 
socialist movement that had started to spread throughout Chile. The government would 
either detain individuals it sought or would offer edicts demanding that specific 
individuals report voluntarily for questioning to the police. The report gives the names of 
different individuals who were not considered politically active. In particular they point 
																																																						
25	Rettig, Raúl. 1991. "National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation ." 	
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out the cases Juan Mamani Garcia and Nicolas Chanez Chanez as individuals who were 
detained and disappeared. But furthermore, the report points out that these, among others, 
were accused of being involved in drug trafficking and contraband though they did not 
receive a trial. Rather individuals were arrested and taken to camps. Subsequently the 
perpetuators who detained these individuals would send letters to families that their loved 
ones claiming that they had been set free. This is where the confusion was created during 
the dictatorship. Individuals were detained and tortured and murdered, but as far as the 
public knew those detained were guilty of something and those detained were often “set 
free”. It is from here that we begin to delve into the first question regarding the blame 
that the commission placed as part of its final report. Because if the leaders of the 
dictatorship remained in power and involved within the state affairs how accurate of a 
portrayal was the report in framing the guilt of those very same actors.  
 
Blame 
From the perspective of many the Rettig report had many shortcomings one of 
which was the inability of the report to accurately frame what happened during the years 
of dictatorship. The report was a very surface level description of the years of 
dictatorship that was able to identify some of the bodies and the identify those who may 
have disappeared. Additionally, it is believed that the report may not have published all 
of the information that the commission came across given the actors that were involved 
within the actual commission. President Aylwin attempted to establish the legitimacy of 
the commission by making sure that it was comprised of different types of individuals. In 
particular Aylwin included Gonzalo Vial Correa as one of the commissioners that formed 
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part of the Rettig Commission. Gonzalo Vial was the minister of education during the 
dictatorship and thus it led some to question the ties or the loyalties that he still felt to the 
armed forces.26 Barbara De Cock and Daniel Michaud Maturana seek to try to establish 
that the report itself is not as truthful as it can be based off an analysis of the language in 
the text. More specifically they believe that the report tries to hide some facts or does not 
present them in an adequate way by choosing certain phrases over others. The others 
explain to us the term “agentividad”.  
To try to translate it may not be a fair representation so I will try to best define the 
explanation given by the authors of the meaning and the significance of the terms. The 
definition in Spanish provided by the authors is, “La agentividad se definió como la 
relación causal entre una entidad agente, una acción intencionada y el estado de quien 
sufre los efectos de la acción.”27 Summarized the authors are trying to communicate that 
“agentividad” is the causal relationship between and agent, an intended action and the 
state of a those who are affected by the intended action. “Agentividad” can be expressed 
through four different means,  
1. Expressions that make direct or indirect reference to the perpetuators. 
2. The verbal predicates that imply the intentionality of the perpetuators (e.g. detain, 
execute) 
3. The structural syntax that invokes the perpetuators 
4. The participle that expresses the state of the victim as a result of the action committed 
by the perpetuator (e.g. disappeared, shot) 28 
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Figure	3-	A	translated	version	of	figure	230 
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Furthermore, the authors clarify that there is varying degree of reference to the 
perpetuators of violence. The first level is when the sentence directly implies a single or 
multiple perpetuators giving the example of a patrol of military members. Meanwhile the 
second degree would be when the sentence states an organization and the reader is 
expected to imply the actors that carried out the action. And finally, the third degree is 
when certain words are used to imply another action so for example they give the 
example of the use of detain and how individuals read it as execution.31 It is with this 
methodology that the authors engage in the analysis of the Rettig report and provide us 
with the results reported in figure 2.  
The authors of the report provide us a with a breakdown of the different levels of 
“agentividad” and the frequency with which they occur throughout the report. It is 
important to highlight how the report tends to favor the objective truth and communicates 
this at the expense of placing blame directly on individuals. We are able to observe that 
the first level of “agentividad is used about 59 times throughout the report, roughly 4.3% 
of the report. This first level according to the table is comprised of naming the 
perpetuator as an agent and expresses the intention of the agent and the casualty that 
resulted of said intention. The second level of agentividad has to do with the perpetuator 
being presented as a complementary agent. An example of a level 1 “agentividad” is the 
example “On October 9 Carabineros of the Penco Station and civilians arrested him at his 
worksite”32. In this example, Carabineros are the national police that patrol Chile and in 
this example the report specifies the station form which the Carabineros were, as well as 
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explicitly mentioning that we are dealing with the Carabineros versus say the army. 
Meanwhile a level 2 agentividad would be more on the lines of a statement like “on 
November 19, 1973 they were executed by military personal, on the road between 
Calama y Antofagasta, the following 26 individuals.”33 In this example the perpetuators 
are summarized to be military personal without specifying what branch of the military 
was responsible for the comes up about 472 times in the report, or about 34.2% of the 
time. It becomes obvious that the commission comprised of individuals from across the 
political spectrum wrote the paper of level of objectivity that to some obscured [art of the 
truth, the truth there were those who were guilty for human rights abuses and those who 
were victims, a distinction that some felt should be muddled. Yet De Cock’s conclusion 
is that the report has a tendency to avoid centering the attention on the perpetuator though 
she believes that the reason for this is the existence of a silent pact between the armed 
forces and the political parties in the immediate aftermath of the dictatorship.34  
Furthermore, beyond the structural composition of the sentences throughout the 
report we can observe that the report itself has very limited aims and excludes many 
topics that would be of great concern to a society after a dictatorship. As Daniela Soto 
points out, it is no accident that in Chile only a truth commission was decreed following 
the end of the dictatorship and that tribunals to hold those individuals responsible 
accountable were not implemented. The purpose of the truth and reconciliation 
commission was to establish and clarify only the truth that was necessary to bring 
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reconciliation to society35. Many including Daniela Soto view the Rettig commission as a 
weak and toothless commission that did not accomplish everything that it should have, in 
their view the commission needed to have some judicial power to be more effective. In 
addressing the question of who is guilty, Soto points out that the problem is that the 
commission presents one narrative, the narrative of the victims while omitting the 
narratives of those who carried out the acts and those who are guilty. To Soto 
reconciliation is a paradox because,  
Reconciliation is about the reintegration of the criminal into the community by means of 
a common recognition that violence has affected everyone and to create a new 
community free of violence, everyone must show themselves willing to incorporate 
themselves into it publicly acknowledging the criminal nature of their previous actions. 
Hilb, 2012:14536 
 
With this definition in mind, Soto questions how it is that the society can incorporate the 
individual who has confessed to crimes against humanity and create reconciliation. Soto 
summarizes the case of the Rettig report in the following way, the Rettig report by 
focusing on establishing a single narrative from the perspective of the victim, established 
a shared responsibility amongst all of society by neglecting to name specific guilty 
individuals. The Rettig Report provided a sense of the gravity of the human rights abuses 
and helped promote the idea that all members should be vigilant in order to prevent the 
atrocities from happening in the future.37  
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But is blame necessary for the success of a report? Some would argue that the 
Truth Commission was successful despite the existence of a silent agreement that did not 
place blame arguing that maybe this silent pact was necessary for the peaceful transition 
in a time when the armed forces remained in the hands of those who ruled in the 
dictatorship. Regardless of whether there is blame placed or not in the truth commission 
there is another important question that remains, how we rebuild as a society? More 
specifically how do we help those most affected by the dictatorship, the victims and the 
families of the victims? 
 
Victims as a Starting Point 
The Rettig Commission made recommendations regarding how the government 
should deal with the victims of the violence and their families. Firstly, the Rettig 
Commission recognized that it was not able to investigate all of the cases of human rights 
abuses because of the timeframe that it was given. Following the publishing of the report 
president Aylwin publicly acknowledged the role of the state in the human rights 
atrocities by the state by acknowledging and certifying the report. Meanwhile he also 
made a public apology to the victims on behalf of the state. The report while generally 
accepted to be accurate did receive criticism and was rejected by the military 
organizations that were headed by the generals of the dictatorship in addition to the 
Supreme Court that was the same that was in power during the latter years of the 
dictatorship. President Aylwin to show his commitment to acknowledging the report 
established the Corporación Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación, also known as the 
National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation. “The objective of the 
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corporation was the ‘coordination, execution, and promotion of the actions necessary for 
complying with the recommendations contained in the Report of the Truth and  
Reconciliation National Commission.’”38 One of the recommendations that report 
highlighted was the necessity for the state to materially compensate the victims through 
reparations in order to address the moral harm to victims.  
 The reparations went further than establishing a monthly pension plan by 
establishing subsidies for the “education of victims’ children, medical benefits.”39 Chile 
is a particular case because it had at the time, and continues to have, one of the strongest 
South American economies in the region because of its copper mines. Eric Wiebelhaus-
Braum points out that 80% of eligible families had accepted the reparations package 
within 9 months of the creation of the program.40 The pension for the nearly 5000 
families that receive this compensation is estimated to be at about $5000 annually, while 
those same families continue to receive other social benefits such as access to 
scholarships and psychological services.41 But beyond the reparations programs the 
corporation created also helped in increasing the number of cases that were examined.  
 Following the establishment of the corporation which invited for new cases to 
submitted for investigation the number of cases soared from 600 unresolved cases from 
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the Rettig commission to nearly 2,119 open cases in less than two years.42 Legally 
victims benefitted from the investigative work of this organization because the 
whereabouts of missing persons became clearer and family members could now prove to 
insurance companies that a family member was deceased in addition to spouses being 
allowed to get divorces.43 The reparation recommendations made by the Rettig 
Commission were largely successful in attempting to provide some compensation for the 
past. However, something that the report established was the need to ensure that this 
never happened again.  
 
Preventing future Human Rights Abuses 
The fundamental goal of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission chaired by 
Rettig was to collect information and investigate claims of human rights abuses so that 
people could know what happened. The purpose was to make clear the timeline and the 
actions that transpired in state secrecy for 17 years. But once the truth is known it is also 
vitally important that the society not forget so as to not allow for the events to occur 
again.  
 Following the publishing of the Rettig report there were attempts to circulate the 
report to as many people as possible. However, a few weeks after release of the report 
there were attacks against right wing political groups in addition to the assassination of a 
right wing political leader. This lead the government to stop the circulation of the report 
out of fear that there would be more violence in addition to the fact that the media 
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wouldn’t focus on the actual findings of the report but rather the violence that ensued. 
The public discussion as a result regarding the need for justice, forgiveness and 
repentance never really took place because of the diversion of the public attention to the 
violence.44 In line with the efforts of remembering the past the Corporation helped found 
the Memorial for the Disappeared and the Executed for Political Reasons.45 This 
memorial in Santiago’s main cemetery pays tribute to all the victims by engraving the 
names of the individuals on a wall. Today in Chile you can find memorials to the victims 
of the dictatorship throughout the country. In particular in Santiago, Chile former 
concentration camps have been remodeled and serve as a museum space for individuals 
to walk through. A particular example of a concentration camp is el Estadio Nacional, the 
national football stadium in Santiago. The stadium was used to detain, torture, and 
murder prisoners and today is still used by the national football team for important 
international matches and for local club matches. But on the grounds of the stadium 
citizens can walk through a museum that tells the history of how the museum was used 
during the dictatorship. Furthermore, the Rettig commission recommended the 
reformation of laws in order to further bolster human rights in Chile.  
 One of the first recommendations by the commission was to urge the Chilean 
government to adopt more laws that furthered the protection of human rights. In addition, 
the commission urged the state to make sure that the laws were in line with protecting 
human rights and if a law did not comply with the ideas of human rights then the state 
should work to ensure that those laws were removed. It specifically points to the military 
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code of justice that allowed the military to execute suspects “without a previous legal 
process” by the means of War Tribunals46. Additionally, in order to “enhance the 
integrity and accountability of judges, the Rettig Commission called for the publication 
of clear standards of judicial qualification” and recommended that through a 
constitutional amendment judges should able to be dismissed very similarly to the way 
which legislators and the president can be.47  
 The report it would appear made an honest attempt at addressing some of the 
issues within the parameters that it was operating under. As mentioned before Pinochet 
and other members of the dictatorship were given amnesty and were free from 
prosecution because they threatened to destabilize the country if they didn’t. However, 
that would all change a couple years down the line when the United Kingdom arrested 
Pinochet for crimes against humanity. Meanwhile the Chilean courts, under the Guzman 
Doctrine defined “disappearance cases in which the body was never found, as kidnapping 
cases"48, kidnapping was not protected under amnesty. By mid 2008 the Supreme Court 
of Chile had 20 judges appointed to focus on disappearances and there were about 500 
military personnel and civilian collaborator on trial with 250 convictions. The report 
made recommendations but what we are able to observe is that the mere existence of the 
report was necessary for justice to be brought about even if not explicitly mentioned in 
the report. The report a representation of truth, endorsed by the government and a report 
whose recommendations were also followed paved the path for people to know what 
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really happen during the dictatorship and for people to bring about the justice they sought 
when the time came.  
 Chile’s case is a very particular case and we have observed some of the 
weaknesses and some of the strengths within a report that is considered to be a success. 
But it is with this analysis that we move on to the case study of Guatemala, a country 
with a complicated history and truth commission.  
 
Chapter 3: Guatemala 
In March of 1999, President Bill Clinton apologized to Guatemala on behalf of 
the United States for its involvement in the Guatemalan civil war, involvement that was 
in the form of supporting right wing governments. In 1954 the United States, through the 
Central Intelligence Agency, provided support for the overthrow of a democratically 
elected president who was suspected of being a communist threat and instead place 
Colonel Carlos Castillo. Four years later would mark the start of a 36 year bloody civil 
war as leftist guerilla groups sought to take the government back. Though during the civil 
war there was a period of time in which civilians took back control of the government 
through a presidential election, the civil “war only intensified with a major 
counterinsurgency campaign by the army.”49 The United States in the civil war trained 
officers teaching them about counterinsurgency techniques through the US Army School 
of the Americas. The report that was released actually places blame on the United States 
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backing of right wing paramilitary groups as a reason for which so many died during the 
civil war, particularly the scorched earth tactics that the United States taught. For 
decades, the country was run by military backed leaders and in 1982 General Efrain Rios 
Montt orchestrated a coup to take the power. A graduate of the school of the Americas, 
and esteemed by President Ronald Reagan as a man of “great personal integrity and  
commitment”50, Montt dissolved the civilian government by annulling a 1965 
constitution, dissolving congress and suspending political parties51. Montt with the use of 
the military and of civilian squads would take back lots of land from the guerrilla in the 
country regions. Montt would come to employ essentially a scorched earth campaign in 
an effort to eradicate the Revolutionary National Unity of Guatemala(URNG), a rebel 
group that had been fighting government forces. But the savage massacre of innocent 
individuals would not end there but would last another decade.  
It wasn’t until 1993 when the United Nations renewed peace talk negotiations 
between the rebels of the Guatemalan Revolutionary National Unity and the Guatemalan 
governments, that Guatemala started to see the light at the end of the dark tunnel. The 
United States Institute of Peace points out that in 1987 there were peace talks between 
government forces and URNG but they ultimately broke down because the URNG was 
engaged in subversive activities throughout.52 Though the United Nations facilitated 
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peace talks both the government and URNG agreed to set up an independent panel to 
investigate human rights abuses during the years of civil war, the Commission for 
Historical Clarification.  
The Commission was chaired by Christian Tomuschat, a law faculty member at 
Berlin’s Humboldt University. The other two members were a woman of Mayan descent 
and a Guatemalan man, all of the commissioners were highly esteemed. The commission 
was set up in a way that it would seem as impartial in the investigation in order to add 
credibility in a country that had just begun the process of rebuilding after 36 years of civil 
war. The conception of the truth commission in Guatemala was a different than that of 
Chile because it was not commissioned by a government but rather was a compromise of 
peace talk negotiations between both belligerents of the civil war, making us consider the 
relative power of bargaining that the parties held in the negotiations. The commission 
was prohibited from publishing the names of any perpetuators, or as many other truth 
commission wasn’t able to punish offenders. As Amy Ross points out there were many in 
society that were dissatisfied with the commission and its report in that it was seen as 
weak. But additionally, many thought that the 2 years allotted to investigate 36 years of 
civil war was dangerously inadequate. Some of the inefficiencies that will be noted 
throughout this chapter can be attributed to the fact that there was lots of disagreement 
and debate over the purpose of the truth commission but more specifically what the truth 
was. Both sides wanted to be able to control the narrative of the truth which proved to be 
so contentious that “the word truth was conspicuously absent”53 from the title of the 
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commission. What distinguished the commission in Guatemala from that of Chile is that 
this commission had some reports of missing individuals but its main concern was 
investigating the genocide of the indigenous people in the country side at the hands of 
government regime. As result the commission had to try harder in order to reach out to 
individuals in the country side and to try to gather testimony of injustice from those 
related to victims. Additionally, in many rural communities, individuals who participated 
in the crimes against humanity continued to hold power and that discouraged some from 
speaking about their experiences fearing that they would face repercussion and that the 
largely symbolic commission would not be able to protect them54. But in the end when 
the report was published lots of the skepticism regarding the strength of the report 
seemed to diminish.  
 
Blame 
In terms of blame, there are many ways to observe the means by which blame was 
placed on the perpetuators of the merciless killings. Though characterized by coups and 
dictatorships the conflict in Guatemala can best be described as a civil war in which 
armed rebellions sought to take back the power they thought had been illegitimately been 
taken in the first place. So, when the report was being commissioned and important 
question was on everyone’s mind, who would be blamed the most? Both sides argued 
that they had undeniable proof of the other side carrying out acts against human rights. 
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So, the commission had to be delicate and precise when describing the atrocities carries 
out by militants of either side.  
 Ultimately, the commission’s investigation found that more than 200,000 
individuals were killed in the civil war. Though the commission was prohibited from 
naming specific individuals, on page 33 of the report it did establish that the government 
military and government paramilitary forces were responsible for 93% of the human 
rights violations investigated during the civil war.55 Most of the casualties, most of the 
persecution was aimed at rural indigenous populations who were perceived to be allies of 
the insurgent groups. Of the more than 200,000 killed it is estimated that 83% of the 
victims were Mayan and 17% were Ladino.56 In light of the undeniable evidence that 
indigenous populations were systematically targeted the report labeled the actions by the 
state as genocide. At the time of the report this was seen as a major victory for the 
victims who thought that the commission would be soft on the perpetuators. The report 
pointed to the fact that villages were razed throughout the country and that the 
government engaged in the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians. The report in 
regard to those within the state responsible for the violence blames the army and the 
successive governments that failed to investigate and punish the injustices of previous 
regimes. The report does highlight the Chiefs of Staff for National Defense as the highest 
authority most culpable for the violation of human rights57. However, with the objective 
of being an impartial investigative body it explicitly states on the next page that the 
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insurgents throughout the civil war were responsible for approximately 3% of the human 
rights violations documented in the study. Though minimal in comparison to the 
violations by the state it was important for the commission to recognize the blame that lie 
on both sides of the civil war. It points out immoral acts for which they were responsible 
such as arbitrary executions, forced recruitment of minors, and indiscriminate massacres. 
To give a sense of the gravity of the violence one must look at the fact that there was 
evidence that the insurgent groups were responsible 32 massacres and yet their share of 
violations was a mere 3%58. The report furthermore states that the individuals at the top 
of the guerilla forces shared undeniable responsibility in the violation of international 
humanitarian laws because many of the violations happened because of their consent or 
their knowledge of. The leaders of the guerillas knew that they too would be blamed for 
human rights violations within the report.  
 Many believe that the commission was weak because the rebels didn’t hold 
enough power and so they couldn’t compel the publishing of names within the Historical 
Clarification Commission. However, as Ross points out there was some doubt by the 
URNG as to whether or not they wanted names to be published. Ross gives us the 
example of how the guerrilla leaders knew that the military and government would be 
able to control the flow of information that was published and that though the guerilla 
leaders weren’t responsible for as many human rights violations, the report may be 
misconstrued by the media to damage guerilla commanders59. Had names been published 
																																																						
58 Truth Commission: Guatemala." United States Institute of Peace. 
59 Ross, Amy. "Truth and Consequences in Guatemala." GeoJournal60, no. 1 (2004): 73-
79. doi:10.1023/b:gejo.0000033585.03206.2c. 
	 	Arroyo	 36	
the leaders of the guerilla forces too would have been targeted. Regardless, the report did 
go on to publish that there weren’t two actors involved, the atrocities of the civil war 
were enabled by different actors including universities and churches.60 Additionally, as 
the NACLA report implies the state knew of the limited capabilities of insurgents to pose 
a threat to the state but the state magnified the threat in order to justify its annihilation of 
the opposition political forces.  
 Indigenous populations were murdered in what is considered to be a genocide and 
thus it is important to evaluate the means through which the commission sought to 
compensate victims of the civil war.  
 
Reparations 
The Historical Clarification Commission recommended that the National 
Reparations Program be established in order to restore material possessions stolen from 
victims such as land, provide economic compensation, psychological rehabilitative 
services among other practices to restore human dignity. The report specified some of the 
logistics of the organization and how it would be financed but largely only gave vague 
recommendations allowing the state to define some of the questions. The problem in 
Guatemala, however, was that at the end of the war they did not have a strong economy 
that could actually afford all the reparations programs recommended by the commission. 
Additionally, as part of the peace agreements the state agreed to carry out economic 
reforms, economic reforms that in 2006 had yet to be carried out in a satisfactory 
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manner61. One of the major obstacles to economic restructuring was the wealthy 
members of Guatemala who blocked reforms that would hurt them such as increased 
taxes. June Erlick points out that in 1997 there was proposed legislation in the congress to 
establish a property taxes that never was approved. In 1997 there were no property taxes 
in a country where 83% of the population lived in poverty and 59% in extreme poverty.62 
The National Reparations Program was established nearly a decade after the publication 
of Historical Clarification report in 2005. 
Under the established program approved families receive compensation of $3000 
which is criticized for being too little. In addition, the number of cases that still need to 
be reviewed is a very large one and the staff that is available is very small and so the 
National Reparations Program is backlogged. However, in the last few years the 
government has reduced the amount of compensation. The Washington Post in 2009 gave 
the example of a man who lost 16 relatives and after 5 years his family received $5,400 in 
compensation along with an apology.63 In 2009 the state acknowledged that it had 64,000 
requests pending, the state also acknowledges that there isn’t enough money for all the 
victims so it has had to privilege older, more vulnerable victims.64 What we see is a state 
that is unable to carry out all of the recommendations because of the limited economic 
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resources of the state and the sheer number of cases in which individuals were murdered. 
Despite the state being unable to fairly compensate the families of victims we see that the 
state has taken some limited steps in order to try to prevent future abuses in line with the 
recommendations of the report.  
 
Remembering 
Guatemala, like Chile, hopes to prevent future human rights abuses by making 
sure that individuals remember the past. Immediately following the publishing of the 
report, the president at the time apologized for the violence committed by the state. The 
state in 2004 dedicated February 25 as the “Day of Dignity”, the national remembrance 
day.  One of the recommendations of the commission was that the government should 
engage in erecting monuments meant to the preservation of the memory of the genocide. 
Though there have been some established the state there are many communities that have 
come together to erect these monuments honoring their dead. As Gidley and Roberts 
point out the dead are highly respected by the living within the Mayan Culture. To the 
Mayan the dead continue to be alive in their own way and are able to communicate with 
the living65. The importance of monuments to the Mayans is explicitly shown through the 
example of Rio Negro. In Rio Negro, a monument was built at the site of a mass grave in 
which 143 bodies had been buried. The monument was vandalized a few days after it was 
																																																						
65 Gidley, Ruth, and Hannah Roberts. 2003. “Setting the Truth in Stone: Guatemala's 
Monuments to the Dead*.” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 19 (2): 148–57. 
doi:10.1080/13623690308409682. 
	 	Arroyo	 39	
erected and the community came together and rebuilt it this time naming the killers as 
being members of the civil patrols.66 
 The report additionally recommended that the state ensure that it commits to 
enforcing and fully carrying out the Peace Accords as well as the National Reconciliation 
Law. However, the National Reconciliation law is widely criticized for not allowing the 
prosecution of criminals of the civil war67. The National Reconciliation Law gave 
amnesty to those actors responsible for human right violations and in exchange the 
government would reincorporate members of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary 
Union and would give amnesty to political crimes by insurgents.  
 Ultimately, what we observe is that Guatemala has not been very successful in 
implementing the reforms suggested by the United Nations led Historical Clarification 
commission. The government has met resistance from wealthy citizens and political 
parties when it has sought to bring about some of the reforms. Additionally, the state 
lacks the resources to distribute the most equitable form of reparations especially given 
the fact that there are hundreds of thousands of victims of the civil war. Though the UN 
led Historical Clarification Commission made waves when it described the targeted 
killing of Mayan and Ladino populations as a genocide the government has not been as 
impactful in addressing the victims.  
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Chapter 4: Argentina and ¡Nunca Más! 
Similar to Guatemala, Argentina suffered a period of instability and violence 
through a “civil war” that primarily erupted following the military coup of 1976 that 
overthrew President Isabel Peron. President Isabel Peron came to power following the 
death of her husband President Juan Peron. President Juan Peron in 1973 was serving his 
third term as President of Argentina after winning the election of 1973 through the use of 
a stand in candidate. The reason he had to use a stand in was that during his second term 
as president he was overthrown in a coup orchestrated by the military in 1955. Following 
the coup, he was forced into exile by the government until 1973 the year democratic 
elections took place. Hector Campora ran in the 1973 election with the intentions of 
winning in order to pave the way for Peron to return to the country and be able to win 
elections. As such shortly after victory of Campora, both he and his vice president 
resigned from power forcing the country to have elections again and this time Peron 
himself was in the election. It is important to highlight however, that the elections of 
1973 occurred right after the end of a military regime that had repressed political 
dissidents. Left wing extremist that arose during the dictatorship did not cease to exist 
and continued to carry out murders and atrocities. However, it is also important to point 
out that government atrocities did not end with the election of Peron.  
During the presidency of Juan Peron and that of Isabel Peron the state continued 
to use violence against the countries’ leftist organizations. The struggle for power in the 
country between military, paramilitary, governmental and rebel forces continued 
throughout the presidencies of the Perons’. This chaos and political repression of the left 
would mark the beginning of the Dirty War, the war that the Truth commission in 
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Argentina would ultimately focus on. Though there was an escalation of violence 
following the coup we observe that the seeds of repression were planted during the Peron 
presidencies. The military following the coup would rule the country through a series of 
military councils that were at the head of a dictatorial regime. For the next 7 years a 
series of general would be the leaders of the country meanwhile continuing their violent 
repression of the left and of political enemies of the state. As Crenzel points out, torture 
and violence against political opponents was systematically practiced throughout the era 
of military dictatorship as the military was resolved on ending once and for all the leftist 
organizations in the country68.  
The states’ repression of the media and of political dissidents created fear within 
Argentina and would be further manifested through feelings of indifference held by 
individuals throughout the country. As Bustos, Webb, and Fairbairn tell us, many 
individuals began to believe that those who disappeared must have done so for a reason 
but even more the feeling was that one should not get involved out fear of being hurt 
themselves.69 These feelings arose because the government would forcefully disappear 
individuals and later deny having the individual, sometimes even denying that they knew 
of said individual, very much like Chile. When victims asked and sought answers to the 
whereabouts of their missing relatives all they got was silence. Additionally, Bustos 
points out that the individuals could not rely on the media to help them out because the 
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media itself was also under the threat of persecution by the government. The government 
targeted individuals that had the power and would spread information regarding its 
regime including, musicians, writers, lawyers, psychologists among others70.  
 The military regimes after stepping down and handing power to the 
democratically president would find themselves being prosecuted by the government of 
Raúl Alfonsin. Upon taking the office of the presidency Alfonsin was swift in 
establishing la Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desparición de Personas(CONADEP) also 
known as the National Commission on the Disappeared. The Argentine truth commission 
CONADEP, has long been regarded as one of the most successful commissions given 
that the findings of the commissions would be used for the eventual prosecution of those 
guilty of crimes against humanity.71The government of Alfonsin was committed to 
ensuring that those individuals responsible for the crimes carried out during the Dirty was 
were held accountable.  
 
Blame 
The last military leader of the government established a law that would give 
immunity to those largely responsible for crimes during the dictatorship. However, 
Alfonsin upon taking office sought to immediately get rid of this immunity that the 
military had given itself. Furthermore, the President held that both the military and the 
armed leftist organizations should be held equally responsible for the chaos and 
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bloodshed of the 7 years.72 This action by the President would prove not only 
empowering to the victims, and the family members of the victims but would also prove 
very beneficial to CONADEP and its mission of establishing truth and eventually justice. 
CONADEP originally was tasked with collecting reports of individuals who 
disappeared and then to look into the cases. However, the commission during its 
investigation realized that in order to find out the most truth about those who had 
disappeared it had to go directly to the source of the disappearance, the perpetuators.73 
The commission hoped that by identifying the perpetuators it would be able to get the 
best account of what happened and would be able to help and even larger number of 
victims and it would be able to identify more individuals that had been forcefully 
disappeared. Additionally, during the Dirty War state forces would torture and illegally 
detain thousands of individuals in clandestine detention centers. There were about 50 
centers found by CONADEP throughout the country of Argentina. Clandestine detention 
centers were for the most part unmarked centers and sometimes would be a home or 
building in the middle of a neighborhood in the greater Buenos Aires province for 
example. The testimony of the perpetuators would be much more helpful in identifying 
the clandestine centers and identifying who was held in these secretive centers. However, 
the names of these perpetuators were not in the official report published by CONADEP. 
Within the actual report CONADEP made more generalizations in regard to those that 
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were responsible. The report does go further in summarizing some of the testimonies that 
were collected during the investigation.  
CONADEP points out how many of the testimonies by perpetuators of human 
rights abuses were not telling their stories out of a sense of guilt but rather for personal 
gain. The report highlights that many individuals decided to give testimony because they 
thought they had been abandoned by those military leaders they had served. Meanwhile 
others were afraid that they would be murdered by individuals higher up than them 
because they knew too much. But through the report’s section on the agents of repression 
it becomes obvious that the agents who gave testimony did not feel guilty over their 
actions because they genuinely believed in the cause that they fought for. Additionally, 
the defense lawyers of the military junta advanced the same notion as a defense. The 
actions by their defendants were as a result of the “’war against subversion’”.74This is 
further expressed when individuals give testimony that they felt used by the state when 
they reflect and realize that the state was not actually promoting the nationalist ideals “for 
which they had joined the Army, the Policy or paramilitary groups in the first place.”75 
But the report also acknowledges other institutions for the impunity and the inaction that 
they exercised during the military dictatorships. The report specifically has a section in 
which it talks about the testimonies in which the catholic church is singled out or 
mentioned as being accomplices or passive actors in the face of injustice and repression. 
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Blame seems to be placed in a very general manner avoiding the publishing of names of 
those perpetuators identified during the investigation. However, the commission at the 
end of the report would recommend that the government ensure that the documents and 
the files collected during the investigations be handed over to the courts in order to aid in 
the prosecution of criminals. The Argentina truth commission focused on establishing the 
truth, thereby accomplishing the task it had been given. However, knowing that it would 
be possible to bring about prosecutions sought to identify individuals who were guilty 
and collect the files that they could later have delivered to courts to carry out 
proceedings.  
 
Reparations 
The commission suggested the state pass laws to provide victims and the family 
of victims, with “economic assistance, study grants, social security and employment and, 
at the same time, to authorize measures considered necessary to alleviate the many and 
varied family and social problems caused by the disappearances”. Additionally, the state 
established the National Commission for Right to Identity as an institution that would be 
responsible for searching for children that went missing during the Dirty War. This was 
to address the fact that children, babies were separated from their parents in some cases 
and given to members of the government to take care of. To this day hundreds of mothers 
and grandmothers continue to look for their children who were taken from them. The 
government recognizes the difficulty of finding all of these children given the fact that 
records of such activities are scarce. But again, it is worth highlight that the state of 
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Argentina like that of Chile has the capacity and the resources to provide compensation to 
many victims who suffered from the dictatorship.  
 In 2004 the Argentine government provided $3 billion USD in reparations for 
those individuals that were detained without a trial from 1976-1979.76 The programs in 
general have had some success in bringing some reparations to the country. But in 
Argentina what do these reparations mean? Nora Sveaass and Ann Sønneland led 
interviews in Argentina with individuals who were either victims or were family 
members of victims. From their interviews, they gathered what was discussed earlier, 
reparations were seen as a form of recognition of the atrocities77. Additionally, they point 
out that those interviewed made it clear that they thought of the reparations as 
compensation for their suffering but not as a form of compensation for their loss because 
they held that their loss was not something that could be quantified. Additionally, the 
authors point to the result that following the lifting of amnesty and the prosecution of all 
the individuals that were involved in the repression during the Dirty Way changed the 
way in which victims saw reparations. Some of the respondents held that the system of 
reparations was unjust, a view that they held particularly strong when impunity remained 
as many perpetuators weren’t being brought to justice. They thought that the state was 
trying to buy their silence and compliance78.  
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¡Nunca Más! 
Following the publishing of the report, also referred to as ¡Nunca Más!,  the 
President of Argentina would seek to bring the military leaders of the dictatorships in 
what would be known as the “Trials of the Juntas.” Additionally, the findings from the 
report were used in order to prosecute the leaders of the military junta with 711 cases 
from the commission report being used in the prosecution of the junta.79 Nine individuals 
were brought to trial during the Trials of the Juntas of which two would be sentenced to 
life imprisonment, while three would receive lesser sentences and four would be 
acquitted. Though early in his time in office President Alfonsin sought the repeal of 
amnesty laws it was not until 2003 that the laws were repealed. In addition, the state 
under Kirchner made an exception to the statute of limitations to allow victims to bring 
cases before the courts in order for them to seek justice. Furthermore, in an attempt to 
stress the results of the commission President Alfonsin sponsored a documentary that 
summarized some of the results of the report. The legitimacy of the report of the 
commission was called into question but was legitimized later by another commission 
that reached many of the same conclusions. The Peronist party created bicameral 
commissions to essentially do the same thing that the original commission report had.80  
The ¡Nunca Más! found that about 9,000 individuals disappeared during the 7 
years of military dictatorship. However, numerous human rights groups believe that this 
is a very low representation of the actual numbers, and the commission acknowledged 
this when it suggested that the real number may up to 30,000 but that not everyone came 
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forward out of fear. In Argentine society, some individuals still dispute the number of 
victims but human rights groups tend to use the number 30,000. But this points to a larger 
problem in Argentine society, the failure to acknowledge the atrocities that the regimes 
brought. As mentioned before, the report found that many perpetuators in interviews still 
firmly believed in that their actions were justified because it was a just cause. Meanwhile 
others do not acknowledge what the report published. But the state has tried to combat 
this through an incorporation of discussions within the classrooms.  Additionally, 
Argentina has adopted reforms such as raising international treatises ratified by 
government to the status of constitutional law81. This step by the government of 
Argentina represents a positive change that shows commitment to upholding international 
law and human rights standards. Individuals, however, must remain vigilant in order to 
ensure that the state does not falter on its commitment. Human rights groups play an 
important role in keeping the pressure on the government to deliver on its promises. One 
said group is the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo.  
The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo is an organization that was created during the 
years of military dictatorship by mothers who were looking for their children that had 
been forcefully disappeared. Las Madres de a Plaza de Mayo to this day march in front of 
the Casa Rosada in the capital of Buenos Aires on Thursdays at 3:30 pm. They hold the 
pictures of their loved ones lost and read out names of those who are still missing. The 
state of Argentina has taken many steps to bring about change and turn the chapter on 
their dark history.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
When we compare and contrast the different truth commissions previously 
mentioned there are many factors that must be kept in mind. Firstly, we must 
acknowledge the different political circumstances under which these commissions were 
started. Additionally, it is important to understand the social context of the countries at 
the time of the truth commissions were started. But with these in factors in mind we can 
still seem some commonalities across the cases that are worth noting. 
First of all, it is important to note that none of the commissions engaged in 
directly naming the perpetuators of the injustices beyond those that may have been 
obvious. Most of the reports seem to make general statements and some are more passive 
in criticizing the role of the government in the injustices. However, this was necessary in 
order to prevent political backlash in all of the countries, countries trying to come to 
terms as to what had just occurred. We see that in Guatemala the commission was tasked 
with investigating crimes during a series of dictatorships plagued by a civil war, thus 
being perceived as impartial for legitimacy was crucial. In Argentina, the government had 
violently repressed actors that were perceived as internal enemies in what the Argentine 
military attempted to describe as a civil war but was far from. Meanwhile the truth 
commission in Chile attempted to establish the truth somewhat limited by the fact that the 
military commanders of the dictatorship continue to hold power over their branches. All 
of the commissions sought to establish the truth, but their ability to use the truth to 
achieve justice was determined by the influence of the perpetuators in power. In 
Guatemala, the fact that the Historical Clarification Commission was established as part 
of the peace agreements that marked the end of the civil war meant that many 
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perpetuators continue to hold power and so trying to bring them to justice would be 
nearly impossible. Chile did not see cases against the most serious offenders, such as 
Pinochet, begin until nearly a decade later. Argentina had the most success in bringing its 
regime to justive because most the military had ceded power in the transition to the 
democratically elected president Alfonsin following its defeat in the war over the 
Falkland Islands to the United Kingdom. The military junta thought that they would be 
safe from prosecution given that they passed amnesty laws before they ceded power but 
that amnesty was removed nearly two decades later by the courts. Though Alfonsin 
brought the military leaders to court almost immediately bringing the individual 
perpetuators to justice took several years. However, the truth commissions work was 
invaluable, and has proven crucial in the cases brought by victims essentially the truth 
commissions are only as powerful as the government that commissions them.  
In the case of Guatemala, the commission proved to be novel and powerful by its 
decision to classify the violence against indigenous populations as genocide. However, 
the Guatemalan government following the peace negotiations failed to pass laws to fairly 
compensate the victims and to punish the aggressors mostly because it continued to be 
fractured. 36 years of civil war and genocide cannot be fixed with the truth. Even justice 
cannot right all of the wrongs but justice for the victims must be a priority for the 
governments. Justice must come in the form of reparations and in the form of trials 
against those who are responsible. Reparations are a form of recognition of the state for 
the harms they have inflicted upon a population and are necessary not to make up for 
what was done but to help alleviate some of the burdens that resulted from said harm. 
Truth commissions are about the state acknowledging what has happened, but also about 
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the state helping families of victims get closure and ensuring that everyone remembers 
what happened, rather than try gloss over the dark period in their history.  
Truth commissions in the three countries have helped provide closure to some 
families while helping others get closer. In the case of forcefully disappeared individuals’ 
families have either been able to find their loved ones or know that that they might have 
been victims of the state. The military in Argentina would destroy records that it did keep 
and would engage in campaigns of misinformation. Within a country the government has 
a greater ability to control the information that the general public has access to, and that’s 
exactly what the states did. They engaged in legitimizing their actions as actions 
necessary to combat the internal enemy and many people believed the state. Many 
people, as evidenced in the Argentine testimonies, truly believed, believe that what they 
did was just and necessary.  
Denial and indifference by citizens in the face of atrocities is actually a well-
documented phenomenon within the academia of psychology. The states of Chile, 
Guatemala, and Argentina sought to control the flow of information and had the power in 
misconstruing information. In most of the states the repression of individuals was 
justified for patriotic reasons. As Sutton and Norgaard point out, Argentina and the 
military dictatorship characterized the leftist organizations as enemies of the state 
engaged in subversion.82 This most closely explains why some perpetuators of violence 
did not feel remorse in the post-dictatorship. And though the countries won’t be able to 
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deal with all of the deniers, won’t be able to change everyone’s mind the report can be 
used as proof and as a legitimate source of information for future generations. But most 
importantly it is important that everyone have access to the knowledge of what the 
government did and the ways in which it may have happened, with or without their 
knowledge. Though the publication of the reports did have some initial backlash in Chile 
where vigilante justice seemed to rise with the publication of the report, we can mostly 
argue that the reason for this vigilante justice was the impunity with which the state acted 
towards the aggressors. We see that in Argentina there was little backlash because the 
president seemed committed justice as evidenced by the prosecution of the junta military. 
Also, we must consider that in Chile discussion regarding the report was weak because of 
the distraction of the public with the violence that seemed to follow the report. 
Meanwhile in Guatemala, though there was public outcry against the government, the 
transitional government formed through peace negotiations weren’t as receptive to the 
demands of the public. Additionally, the granting of amnesty and the continued 
participation of perpetuators of violence within the Guatemalan government also hurt the 
discussions regarding the commission’s findings. But within these processes of 
restoration of justice and democracy and the rule of law all individuals must remain 
vigilant.  
Sonia Cardenas points out that during the dictatorship of Pinochet, the 
government defended human rights as something fundamental to Chilean democracy yet 
we observed some of the most egregious violations within the same government83. 
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Additionally, Cardenas gives the example of Argentina that under the military 
dictatorship also seemed committed to uphold human rights it did not translate into 
anything. Ultimately, governments will justify their violations of human rights through 
different rhetorical means and that was consistent through the cases of Chile, Argentina, 
and Guatemala. In all of the countries the victims were enemies of the state and in some 
of them, out of fear people believed that they must have done something to be targeted. 
The atmosphere of fear created by the repression can also explain some of the limited 
successes of the governments bringing about change through the use of the truth 
commission.  
Sikkink argues that in Guatemala repression was so severe that it eliminated or 
silenced the human rights movement”.84 Meanwhile in Chile and Argentina, not many 
individuals died as a direct result of massacres but rather Chilean and Argentinian 
citizens lived in fear of being forcefully disappeared. The scorched earth policy 
implemented by the Guatemalan armed forces was extremely harmful because those most 
likely to speak out were murdered. But the truth commissions gave individuals an 
opportunity they had not been given before. They were given a space to share their 
experiences, stories, their petitions for loved ones and someone was finally willing to 
listen.  
																																																						
Southern Cone." Journal of Human Rights5, no. 4 (2006): 439-51. 
doi:10.1080/14754830600978224. 
84 Sikkink, Kathryn. "From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the 
Struggle for International Human Rights." Latin American Politics and Society50, no. 1 
(2008): 1-29. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2008.00002.x. 
 
	 	Arroyo	 54	
All of the reports mentioned the need to try to find as many victims as possible 
regardless if they lived in urban or rural settings. For many people, the truth commissions 
were necessary to feel heard to feel like someone actually cared about what had happened 
to their loved ones. It would seem commissions in this respect have been able to achieve 
something very important beyond establishing the truth. However, though it is important 
for these individuals to be heard they will also tell you that seeking justice is equally 
important. All three of the commissions had very similar recommendations which 
revolved around the need for reparations and the need to ensure that it did not happen 
again. We see that more important than the stated goals of a truth commission, is the 
ability of the governments to commit to implementing the recommendations in an 
effective manner. Acknowledgement of past atrocities, whether through the findings of 
the truth commission or through the reparations that they recommend are not enough to 
achieve justice.   
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